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Firm life cycle and advisory directors 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper investigates whether the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors 
varies across firm life cycle stages. We follow a parsimonious life cycle proxy based on the 
predicted behaviour of operating, investing, and financing cash flows across the different life 
cycle stages that result from firm performance and the allocation of resources. Using an 
Australian sample, this study shows that compared to mature stage firms, firms in the 
introduction, shake-out and decline stages have more advisory directors. With respect to the 
demand for monitoring directors, we find that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the 
introduction, shake-out and decline stages have fewer monitoring directors on the board.  We 
contribute to the literature on boards of directors by documenting that firms choose an 
optimal board structure based on their economic characteristics.  
 
Keywords: Advisory directors; firm life cycle; monitoring directors; Australia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
We examine whether the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors varies 
across firm life cycle stages. Economic theory suggests that the board of directors is an 
important element of the governance structure of the corporation (Adams et al., 2010; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003). The board serves two functions: advisory and 
monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Monks and Minow, 2004). The advisory function requires that 
directors use their expertise to counsel management in establishing and implementing new 
and potentially risky strategic initiatives. The monitoring function requires the board to act as 
a “watchdog” in order to align the incentives of management with the interests of 
shareholders (Chen, 2008; Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Adams and Ferreira (2007) show that 
if the advisory and monitoring functions are performed by the same group of directors, then 
the CEO is unwilling to share information that helps directors to provide advice, since the 
same information set can also be used for monitoring the CEO. A separation between 
advisory and monitoring board members is beneficial because it serves as a substitute for a 
commitment not to use the revealed information against the CEO (Laux and Laux, 2009). 
 Evidence suggests that a set of firm-level variables determines the characteristics of 
advisory directors, e.g., professional expertise and experience valuable for strategic decision 
making, entrepreneurial background, CEO-level experience, advanced degrees, and longer 
board tenures (Faleye et al., 2013). Evidence also suggests that boards with more advisory 
directors increase firm value (Coles et al., 2008; Faleye et al., 2013), and earnings persistence 
(Hsu and Hu, 2015). Although insightful, these studies take a static view of advisory boards 
in that they do not consider the variation in the intensity of board advice during different life 
cycle stages. We investigate the role of firm life cycle as a determinant of advisory boards 
and, hence, respond to a call for additional research on this aspect (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; 
Filatotchev and Wright, 2005; Perrault and McHugh, 2015).    
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 While both advisory and monitoring functions are value additive, Filatotchev and 
Wright (2005) propose that the advisory role of directors may vary in importance depending 
upon the phase of a firm’s life cycle, because strategic postures and the challenges of strategy 
implementation also vary across different life cycle stages. For example, firms in the 
introduction and growth phases of their life cycle may be better served by directors with 
advisory skills, as these directors can offer legitimacy to the firm that, in turn, attracts other 
resource providers, such as investors and established suppliers: a strategy that is particularly 
important for resource-constrained, entrepreneurial firms (Perrault and McHugh, 2015; 
Withers et al., 2012).  
 We choose Australia as our setting for investigating the association of life cycle with 
the presence of advisory boards because of its flexible governance environment. The 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council released ‘The 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations’ in 2003. 
The recommendations adopted the ‘comply or explain’ principle, which allows companies to 
choose whether to comply with the recommendations, but requires that non-compliance be 
disclosed in the annual reports. Such ‘comply or explain’ types of regulatory guideline are 
designed to overcome the ‘one size fits all’ criticism by allowing for more flexibility. It 
should be noted that corporate governance guidelines do not prescribe the composition (size 
and characteristics) of advisory committees but, instead, are more geared towards the 
formation and functioning of monitoring committees.   
 We define advisory directors as independent and/or executive directors (excluding 
CEOs) who are not members of the monitoring committees, but who serve on the nomination 
committee, where the firm has a separate nomination committee. If the company has no 
standing nomination committee, then advisory directors are directors who are not members of 
the monitoring committees. We include nomination committee members as advisory directors 
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because of their role, among others, in the recruitment of directors with appropriate skills, 
knowledge, and experience required for board functions.1 
 We use a parsimonious life cycle measure proposed by Dickinson (2011) as our 
primary independent variable. Dickinson (2011)  groups firms into five life cycle stages, such 
as: ‘introduction’, ‘growth’, ‘mature’, ‘shake-out’ and ‘decline’, based on the cash flow 
patterns of firms. Using a sample of 11,251 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2014, we 
find that, compared to mature stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline 
stages have more advisory directors. With respect to the demand for monitoring directors, we 
find that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline 
stages have fewer monitoring directors on the board. 
 Our study contributes to both the corporate governance and the firm life cycle 
literature. First, we extend the governance literature by revealing the presence of different 
levels of advisory directors in different life cycle stages. Prior literature on board formation 
has generally taken a static view, by proposing a number of firm fundamentals as the 
determinants of the size and composition of the board (Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008; 
Monem, 2013). These studies fail to capture the variation of board composition during 
different life cycle stages. Huse and Zattoni (2008), use a case study approach on three 
Norwegian small firms to show evidence that board behaviour changes over the life-cycle 
phase. They raise a concern over the generalisability of their research findings and call for 
additional research. We respond to this call. Second, our findings complement a stream of 
research that documents the importance of organisational life cycle in influencing dividend 
payout (e.g., DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2001), capital structure (Berger and 
Udell, 1998), investment decisions (Richardson, 2006), cost of equity (Hasan et al., 2015), 
corporate risk taking (Habib and Hasan, 2017), tax avoidance (Hasan et al., 2016) and the 
pricing of accruals and cash flows (Hribar and Yehuda, 2015). Even though these studies 
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suggest that firm life cycle has profound implications on corporate decisions and outcomes, 
surprisingly, board composition during different life cycle stages, in particular the 
composition of advisory directors, has remained unexplored. Our study fills this void in 
literature. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses existing 
literature and develops our testable hypotheses. The following section explains the research 
design and sample selection process. Section 4 presents the results, and the last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and development of hypotheses  
2.1 Firm life cycle and board composition  
 
The board of directors is the primary governance mechanism responsible for approving 
corporate strategies, hiring and firing top executives, ensuring financial reporting integrity, 
and setting appropriate compensation for CEOs (Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998, 2003).2 The board serves two functions: advisory and monitoring (Jensen, 1993; 
Monks and Minow, 2004). Adams and Ferreira (2007), Harris and Raviv (2008), Raheja 
(2005) and Song and Thakor (2006) provide theoretical models for the board’s influence over 
strategy and conclude that the advisory role depends critically on information provided by the 
CEO. Advisory directors are intimately involved in counselling the CEO when initiating and 
implementing new and potentially risky strategic initiatives (Daily and Dalton, 1992;  Demb 
and Neubauer, 1992;  Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). Also, the industry-specific skills and 
expertise of those advisory directors can help mitigate information asymmetries between 
management and shareholders (Masulis et al., 2012). 
 The monitoring of management is also very important. The likelihood of self-
interested managerial behaviour necessitates vigilant monitoring by independent or non-
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executive directors, who have no financial interest in the firm. But intense monitoring leads 
to a detrimental impact on the advisory role compromising the board’s ability to create value 
(Faleye et al., 2011). Finally, intense monitoring can promote managerial myopia by 
weakening the CEO’s perception of board support, which is necessary to encourage 
investment in risky but value-enhancing ventures, such as corporate innovation (Faleye et al., 
2011). 
 While both advisory and monitoring functions are important, Filatotchev and Wright 
(2005) propose that the advisory role of directors may vary in importance depending upon the 
phase of a firm’s life cycle. Corporate life cycle theory proposes that firms pass through a 
series of stages throughout their life cycle, and that the resources, capabilities, strategies, 
structures and functioning of the firm including functioning of the board vary significantly 
with stages of development (Miller and Friesen, 1980, 1984; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). 
Assessing the life cycle stages is difficult, as each individual firm is composed of many 
overlapping, but distinct, product life cycle stages. Previous research generally suggests a 
four or five stage life cycle model. For example, Quinn and Cameron (1983) propose that 
firms progress through entrepreneurial, growth, maturity, and decline phases. Dickinson 
(2011) argues that cash flows capture differences in a firm’s profitability, growth and risk 
and, hence, that one may use the cash flow from operating (OCF), investing (INVCF) and 
financing (FINCF) activities to group firms into five life cycle stages: ‘introduction’, 
‘growth’, ‘mature’, ‘shake-out’ and ‘decline’. Firms in the introduction stage suffer from 
negative cash flows because of a lack of established brands, and entrepreneurs’ knowledge 
deficits about potential revenues and costs. During the growth and mature stages profit 
margins are maximised, because increases in investment and efficiency generate positive cash 
flows. Shake-out stage firms experience declining sales, earnings, and operating cash flows. 
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Finally, during the decline stages of the firm life cycle, declining growth rates lead to 
declining prices and, hence, negative cash flows.  
 
2.1 Advisory directors and firm life cycle  
 With respect to board composition across life cycle stages, we posit that firms in the 
introduction stage face the critical challenge of garnering support from external stakeholders. 
This task is difficult if there is an absence of a proven reputation for succeeding in a 
competitive environment (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Petkova et al., 2008). These firms, in 
particular, are resource-constrained and, require advice for procuring resources to execute 
strategies. It is conjectured that firms in the introduction stage may be better served by 
directors with advisory skills. These directors can also offer legitimacy to the firm, to attract 
other resource providers, such as investors, and established suppliers (Perrault and McHugh, 
2015; Withers et al., 2012).  
 At the growth stage, firms actively seek new investment opportunities to expand their  
operations across business segments and geographic boundaries and require substantial 
investment in strategic projects (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). A firm in the growth stage 
is likely to replace the founder of the business by professional managers and develop a more 
formalised organisational structure (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009). Operating activities at the 
growth stage require more internal control, coordination and integrated decision-making 
methods. Advisory directors, by dint of their skills, expertise and social connections, can 
assist growth firms in coordinating control activities, and in formulating and implementing 
strategy for expanding operations to assist further growth and development. Appointing more 
advisory directors in the growth stage also helps firms in gaining legitimacy, thereby assuring 
external stakeholders of the viability of the organisation (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; Perrault 
and McHugh, 2015).  
9 
 
 Firms’ transition in the shake-out stage is manifested by declining sales, earnings, and 
operating cash flows (Dickinson, 2011). As a firm slips to the shake-out stage, management 
often reassess the strategies currently in place to deal with the different stakeholder groups 
(Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). To ensure survival and regain market share, management 
of the shake-out stage is likely to consider such strategies as product-redevelopment, mergers, 
downsizing, and layoffs. Kazanjian (1988) also notes the importance of developing second-
generation or completely new products to spur growth as a survival strategy. However, given 
the highly competitive marketplace, downgraded resources, and other detrimental changes in 
the external environment, initiating and implementing survival strategies for shake-out stage 
firms is very challenging. This prompts management to resort to advisory directors with 
strategic expertise, who can counsel management in establishing and implementing new and 
potentially risky strategic initiatives to keep the company healthy and competitive. The 
preceding discussion, therefore, predicts a strong demand for advisory directors in the shake-
out stage as well.   
 Conventional operating activities are absent in the declining stage of a firm and the 
board size tends to become smaller as the declining stage progresses (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
Gilson, 1989, 1990). Firms focus on ‘retrenchment’ and ‘recovery response’ activities at the 
declining stage. Barker and Mone (1994) suggest that highly distressed firms often sell off 
their best assets to raise cash. While such an action can have a negative effect on corporate 
efficiency, Robbins and Pearce (1992) argue that retrenchment leads to a more successful 
turnaround. However, choosing a poor downsizing strategy, or implementing the chosen 
strategy poorly, could further push a firm into decline (Sutton et al., 1986). Cameron et al. 
(1991) criticise most downsizing activities for being solely focused on quick work force 
reduction to reduce costs, as this may be the least effective method of downsizing. A 
declining firm requires a high level of strategic reorientation and the advisory director is the 
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best person to assist the CEO to implement an effective strategy skilfully. Bonn and 
Pettigrew (2009) suggest that firms can address declining stage challenges through 
persuading directors to stay on board, or appointing new directors,  in order to implement or 
reorient business strategies. Therefore, the necessity for an advisory director is inevitable, 
even in the declining stage.  
 Since Dickinson (2011) classifies firm life cycle into five stages, empirical execution 
requires one of the stages to be incorporated into the intercept. We consider the mature stage 
as our benchmark life cycle stage. Firms in the mature stage are well-established and tend to 
be larger than at any other stage of the firm life cycle (Dickinson, 2011).  The mature stage of 
the firm life cycle generally results in a shift toward efficiency maximisation, reduced 
uncertainty and declining investment expenditure relative to the growth phase, along with 
greater capital distribution to shareholders (Barclay and Smith, 2005; Habib and Hasan, 
2015). Profit maximisation in this stage is evidenced by growth in profitability (e.g., return on 
net operating assets) and in retained earnings, leading to higher and sustained dividend 
payouts (DeAngelo et al., 2006). In this stage, decision-making becomes standardised, less 
strategic and proactive, and more risk-adverse than in any other stage (Miller and Friesen, 
1984). Consequently, boards in mature organisations are not directly involved in strategy 
formulation (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, availability of resources and established 
connections with key stakeholders reduce the resource providing role of advisory directors. 
At this stage, the value protection role of corporate governance becomes particularly 
important (Filatotchev et al., 2006). Therefore, we expect the demand for advisory directors 
to decrease during the mature stage of the firm life cycle. 
 
We hypothesise as follows: 
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 H1. The need for advisory directors varies across life cycle stages, with firms in the 
introduction, growth, shake-out, and decline stages demanding more advisory 
directors, when compared to the mature stage of the firm life cycle.  
 
2.2. Monitoring directors and firm life cycle 
 
 At the introduction stage of the life cycle, firms generate negative cash flows because 
of knowledge deficit about potential revenues and costs (Dickinson, 2011). Firms at this stage 
seek directors who can provide resources for strategy formulation and execution. The demand 
for monitoring directors is less, because of the absence of free cash flow-induced agency 
conflicts. The demand for monitoring directors in the growth stage is ex-ante unclear. Firms 
at this stage might require fewer monitoring directors, because of their focus on innovation, 
brand development, and organisational growth: activities that are better served by advisory 
directors. However, growth firms also are likely to suffer from growth-oriented agency 
conflicts requiring monitoring by directors. At the shake-out and declining stages, firm cash 
flows decline, thereby minimising the free cash flow-induced agency costs and, hence, the 
demand for monitoring directors. Moreover, monitoring directors withdraw their directorial 
positions from these firms, to retain their ‘elite’ reputation in the job market (D’Aveni, 1990). 
At this stage, firms try to reinvent their business strategy to rebound back to profitability.  A 
tighter monitoring by boards could become a constraint for the reinvention process (Francis 
and Smith, 1995). 
 Mature firms focus more on formal controls, budgets and performance measures, and 
earning adequate profit margins by their smooth and efficient functioning in a competitive 
market (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009). However, mature firms are exposed to the agency costs 
of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). As investment opportunities decline while cash flows 
increase, managers of mature firms tend to invest in negative net present value projects to 
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prevent retrenchment. Therefore, at this stage, the value protection role of corporate 
governance becomes particularly important and, mature firms devote more resources to value 
preservation rather than value creation (O’Connor and Byrne, 2015). Filatotchev et al. (2006) 
document that as firms mature, the resource or strategy role of governance becomes less 
relevant, while the monitoring or control function becomes more important. Therefore, we 
expect the demand for monitoring directors to increase during the mature stage of the firm 
life cycle. The preceding discussion, therefore, leads to the following hypothesis:  
  
 H2. The need for monitoring directors varies across firm life cycle stages, with firms 
in the introduction, shake-out, and decline stages demanding fewer monitoring 
directors, when compared to the mature stage of the firm life cycle.  
 
3. Research design and sample selection  
3.1. Model 
We estimate the following models to test the association between firm life cycle stages and 
the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors.  
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Where, ADVDIR is the proportion of advisory directors. We define advisory directors as 
independent and/or executive directors (excluding CEOs) who are not members of the 
monitoring committees, but who serve on the nomination committee, where the firm has a 
separate nomination committee. If the company has no standing nomination committee, then 
advisory directors are directors who are not members of the monitoring committees. We scale 
the number of advisory directors by total board size and use this continuous measure, 
ADVDIR, as our main empirical construct.   
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 Our main variable of interest is LC_DUM and we expect the coefficient to vary across 
life cycle stages with respect to the demand for advisory directors and monitoring directors. 
We follow the life cycle model proposed by Dickinson (2011), who argues that cash flows 
capture differences in a firm’s profitability, growth and risk and, hence, that one may use the 
cash flow from operating (OCF), investing (INVCF) and financing (FINCF) activities to 
group firms into life cycle stages, such as: ‘introduction’, ‘growth’, ‘mature’, ‘shake-out’ and 
‘decline’.3 The classification is based on the following cash flow pattern: 
 (1) Introduction (INTRO):       if   OCF < 0, INVCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
(2) Growth (GROWTH):       if   OCF ˃ 0, INVCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
(3) Mature (MATURE):       if   OCF ˃ 0, INVCF < 0 and FINCF < 0;  
(4) Decline (DECLINE):       if   OCF < 0, INVCF ˃ 0 and FINCF ≤ or ≥ 0; and  
(5) Shake-out (SHAKE-OUT):  the remaining firm years. 
 
 We expect the demand for advisory directors to be higher during the introduction, 
growth, shake-out and decline stages of their life cycle, while lower during the mature stage. 
We include a number of firm characteristics that are likely to affect the proportion of 
advisory directors. The demand for advisory directors should decrease for larger firms as 
these firms have fewer growth opportunities and hence less need for advising requirements. 
Large firms may require more monitoring instead of advising because of their complexities 
and resource availability. Directors of large firms are more likely to focus on monitoring 
large firms as the reputational consequences for oversight failures can be quite damaging 
(Faleye et al., 2013). We use the natural logarithm of total assets as our proxy for size (SIZE). 
We use the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LEV) as a measure of dependence on 
external financial resources and expect a positive association with the demand for advisory 
directors.4 Growth firms (MTB – measured as market value of equity divided by book value 
of equity), need more advisory services, therefore, a positive coefficient is expected. We use 
the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets as a measure of asset structure 
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and expect this to be negatively related to the demand for advisory directors (Coles et al., 
2008). The probability of an individual director serving in an advisory role increases with 
board size (number of members on the board) (BSIZE) but decreases with a larger proportion 
of independent directors (number of independent directors to board size) (INDPEN) on the 
boards, since independent directors are more likely to serve on the monitoring committees.5 
We include industry and year dummies to control for industry and fiscal year effects, 
respectively.  
 Finally we estimate the following regression specification to test H2, i.e., the 
association between firm life cycle and the presence of monitoring directors.  
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MONDIR is the ratio of the number of independent directors who are members of the 
audit (AC) and/or remuneration committees (RC) to the total board size. Other variables are 
defined as before. We expect the presence of monitoring directors to be higher during the 
mature stage of the firm life cycle, while lower during the introduction, shake-out and decline 
stages. However, this prediction may not gain empirical support, as corporate governance 
guidelines require the monitoring committees to be composed of a majority, if not all, 
independent directors, providing  less cross-sectional variation for our regression estimations. 
To take into account the time series and cross sectional dependence in the error terms of our 
regression, in all regression models, we calculate t-statistics using standard errors that are 
clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). 
 
3.2. Sample selection  
 
 We collect director-level data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA). The ‘Corporate Governance Database’ of SIRCA identifies advisory 
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directors, who are defined as directors and are not members of the monitoring committees 
(namely audit committees, compensation committees, and nomination committees). The 
SIRCA database covers governance data for 1500 listed Australian firms. Our sample period 
spans 2001 to 2014. We begin with 2001 because corporate governance data from SIRCA 
first became available in 2001. We collect financial statements data from Compustat Global 
file. Our initial sample is 18,239 non-financial firm-year observations with non-missing data 
to calculate firm life cycle following the Dickinson (2011) measure.6 We then drop 6,382 
firm-year observations with missing director-level information in SIRCA to identify advisory 
and monitoring director status. Missing control variables (a total of 606 firm-year 
observations) reduced the sample to 11,251 firm-year observations. All the continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the undesirable influence of 
outliers. 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression estimates. 
Panel A reports pooled descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control 
variables, Panel B presents the industry distribution of the sample observations, and Panel C 
presents the life cycle-wise mean difference of advisory and monitoring directors. With 
respect to the distribution of observations across life cycle stages, we find that the highest 
(lowest) percentage of firm-year observations belong to the introduction (INTRO) (decline 
(DECLINE)) stages of the life cycle (32.5% and 8.7% respectively). Pooled descriptive 
statistics at the firm-level reveal that, on average, advisory directors (ADVDIR) constitute 
48.6% of the total directors, with an interquartile range of 25% to 66.7%. Our definition of 
ADVDIR includes both independent advisory directors (ADVDIR_IND) and executive 
advisory directors (ADVDIR_EXEC). The respective proportions are 25.9% and 29.4%. The 
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average proportion of MONDIR is 29%. Interestingly we find that 17.3% of directors serve 
on both the advisory and the monitoring boards (BOTHDIR). All the director-level variables 
exhibit considerable variation among firms, thereby supporting the view that the composition 
of different categories of directors varies across firms (optimal choice theory). Average board 
size is six, with 71% of the directors serving in the capacity of independent director. Our 
sample firms are low-leveraged (average debt to asset ratio of 10.8%) but high growth firms 
(a mean MTB ratio of 2.68). PPE is 35.2% of total assets.  
 Panel B, Table 1 shows that 33% of the sample observations belongs to the materials 
industry (ASX distribution as retrieved from Compustat Global is 36%) followed by the 
industrials (16%) (ASX distribution as retrieved from Compustat Global is 13%) and 
consumer discretionary (14%) (ASX distribution as retrieved from Compustat Global is 
11%).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Table 2 reports the pair-wise comparison of ADVDIR, MONDIR, and BOTHDIR, for 
different life cycle stages. We perform an ANOVA test followed by Tukey’s HSD (honest 
significant difference) method to determine whether the means of the proportions of different 
categories of directors for the various pair-wise relationships are significantly different from 
each other. This table shows that the means for ADVDIR decrease significantly from the 
INTRO to the remaining life cycle stages (e.g., from 0.597 in the INTRO stage to 0.364 in the 
MATURE stage). The proportions significantly increase from the MATURE to the SHAKE-
OUT stage (0.364 versus 0.51), from the MATURE to the DECLINE stage (0.364 versus 
0.611), and from the SHAKE-OUT to the DECLINE stage (0.51 to 0.611). The results, 
therefore, support the theoretical argument that firms in the mature stage have the lowest 
proportion of ADVDIR. The proportion of MONDIR decreases significantly from the 
MATURE to the SHAKE-OUT stage and from the MATURE to the DECLINE stage, but 
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increases significantly from the INTRO to the MATURE stage. The test result provides 
support for the hypothesis that the demand for monitoring directors is highest during the 
mature stage of the life cycle. The proportion of BOTHDIR decreases significantly from 
MATURE to SHAKE-OUT, MATURE to DECLINE, SHAKE-OUT to DECLINE, 
GROWTH to SHAKE-OUT but increases significantly from INTRO to GROWTH of the life 
cycle.    
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation analysis. Consistent with our expectation, ADVDIR is 
significantly and positively correlated with INTRO, SHAKE-OUT and DECLINE stages of 
the firm life cycle (coefficients 0.24, 0.03 0.12 respectively, p<0.01), while this is 
significantly negatively correlated with GROWTH and MATURE stages (coefficient -0.14 
and -0.22 respectively, p<0.01). The correlation matrix also suggests that firms in the 
GROTWH and MATURE stages are positively correlated (p<0.01) with MONDIR, whereas 
firms in the INTRO and DECLINE stages are negatively correlated (p<0.01) with MONDIR.  
The correlation between BOTHDIR and MATURE is significantly positive (p<0.01) while 
that with INTRO is significantly negative (p<0.01). 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
4.3. Regression results  
 
 Table 4, presents the regression results for Equation (1). We use the MATURE stage 
as the benchmark, and report results for all advisory directors (ADVDIR) (column 1), 
independent advisory directors only (ADVDIR_IND) (column 2) and non-independent 
advisory directors (ADVDIR_EXEC) (column 3). The coefficients on INTRO, SHAKE-OUT 
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and DECLINE are positive and significant (0.047, p<0.01, 0.027, p<0.05 and 0.054, p<0.01 
respectively). These results are consistent with H1. Nonetheless, the coefficient on 
GROWTH is insignificant, implying that growth and mature stages are statistically 
indistinguishable.  Among the control variables, we find that larger firms, firms with more 
tangible asset structure and more independent directors, demand fewer advisory directors. 
Firms with greater board size, on the other hand, demand more advisory directors. Column 
(2) presents the regression results for the association between firm life cycle and independent 
advisory directors. Results are quite similar to those reported in column (1) (e.g., the 
coefficients on INTRO, SHAKE-OUT, and DECLINE are 0.037, 0.024, and 0.039 
respectively, p<0.01). In column (3) we report results using executive advisory directors as 
the dependent variable. We find the coefficient on INTRO to be positive and significant 
(0.014, p<0.01), suggesting that firms in the introduction stage of their life cycle demand 
more independent and executive advisory directors. The coefficients on GROWTH and 
DECLINE are insignificant, and that on SHAKE-OUT is significantly negative (-0.019, 
p<0.01).   
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  Table 5 presents regression results for H2, i.e., the association between firm life cycle 
and the demand for monitoring directors. We find evidence that the demand for monitoring 
directors is weaker for firms in the INTRO (-0.038, p<0.01), SHAKE-OUT (-0.020, p<0.10) 
and DECLINE (-0.056, p<0.01) stages of their life cycles when compared to the MATURE 
stage of their life cycle (column 1). This evidence is consistent with H2. However, coefficient 
on GROWTH is statistically insignificant, suggesting that growth and mature stages are 
statistically indistinguishable.  Among the control variables, firms with a larger PPE and 
higher leverage demand more monitoring directors. From a regulatory perspective, directors 
serving on the monitoring committees (primarily AC and RC) must be independent outside 
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directors with no financial ties with the companies (ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations, 2010). It is, therefore, not surprising to see a positive and significant 
coefficient on INDPEN. The coefficient on BSIZE is negative implying that larger boards 
have less monitoring directors.   
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3.1 The proportion of monitoring directors to advisory directors 
 
In column (2) we report results using the proportion of monitoring directors to advisory 
directors (MONDIR/ADVDIR) as the dependent variable. This test tells us which of the two 
functions is more important at any one time. Consistent with our findings on H2, we 
document that the monitoring function is less important than the advisory function in the 
INTRO (-0.257, p<0.01), SHAKE-OUT (-0.193, p<0.01) and DECLINE (-0.290, p<0.01) 
stages when compared to the MATURE stage of the firm life cycle.  
 
4.3.2 Directorships on both the advisory as well as the monitoring committees 
 
Our sample consists of directors who serve in both advisory and monitoring capacities (a total 
of 3,855 firm-year observations). It is intuitive to argue that directors are not appointed to 
perform an exclusive role, e.g., either advisory or monitoring only.  Instead many directors 
are appointed to perform both roles, and it is most likely that such directors will be found 
across all life cycle stages. Column (3) in Table 5 shows that the coefficients on the INTRO 
(-0.028, p<0.05), SHAKE-OUT (-0.028, p<0.05) and DECLINE (-0.026, p<0.10) stages of 
the firm life cycle are negative using the MATURE stage as the benchmark. This 
corroborates the hypothesis that firms at different life cycle stages have different demands for 
advisory and monitoring directors.   
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5. Conclusions   
 
 This paper examines the presence of advisory directors as well as monitoring directors 
at different stages of the firm life cycle. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a firm structures 
its board in response to its needs to obtain unbiased and expert information. Existing research 
examines the link between the strategic role of advisory directors and its effects on 
acquisitions, corporate innovation and firm value. Despite the widespread belief that boards 
should mirror the firm’s external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and that 
environmental changes should lead to board changes, the demand for advisory board 
members at different stages of the firm life cycle is still unexplored. Using the Australian 
regulatory setting, we provide evidence that firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline 
stages of the firm life cycle utilise more advisory directors, when compared to the mature 
stage. Further, we examine the presence of monitoring directors during the different stages of 
the firm life cycle and find evidence that the demand for monitoring directors is less in the 
introduction, shake-out and decline stages of the firm life cycle, when compared to the 
mature stage. Our analysis also reveals that demand for advisory directors and monitoring 
directors is statistically indistinguishable in growth and mature stages. Our findings lead to a 
deeper and more complete understanding of an aspect of organisational complexity that the 
‘one size fits all’ nature of corporate governance guidelines fails to address.  
 Our research findings should be beneficial to the regulators, policy makers and 
professional and academic research. To date, Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 
mostly emphasizes on the necessity of a monitoring director without recognizing the 
contribution of an advisory role. Our findings evidence that the necessity of advisory 
directors is equally important parallel to the monitoring director across the different stage of 
firm life cycle. Standard setters could encourage firms to develop corporate governance 
structure accommodating advisory directors to maintain a balance between both advisory and 
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monitoring directors. Academic research can examine the beneficial role of advisory directors 
to overcome distress operating performance and understand their contribution towards 
effective investment decision,  
 Our paper is not without limitations. First, we have measured advisory directors as 
those who don’t serve on the monitoring committees. However, such a measure may fail to 
capture the individual characteristics that could impact the demand for such directors across 
different life cycle stages. Future research may enrich this measurement by looking into the 
detailed biographical discussion about the directors. Second, the sample selection bias is 
obviously a concern. We used director-level information retrieved from SIRCA which covers 
the top 1500 Australian companies.  These are large companies with different demand for 
advisory and monitoring directors. Extending this study to mid and small-sized companies 
may shed additional insights into how life cycle stages shape the demand for advisory and 
monitoring directors.
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Notes 
 
1. We consider directors serving on the nomination committees as advisory directors, because the Australian 
Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendation 2010 outline the following 
activities of nomination committees as advisory in nature: (a) board succession planning generally (b) induction 
and continuing professional development programs for directors (c) the development and implementation of a 
process for evaluating the performance of the board, its committees and directors (d) the process for recruiting a 
new director, including evaluating the balance of skills, knowledge, experience, independence and diversity on 
the board and, in the light of this evaluation, preparing a description of the role and capabilities required for a 
particular appointment (e) the appointment and re‐election of directors; and (f) ensuring there are plans in place 
to manage the succession of the CEO and other senior executives. 
2. A substantial volume of academic research has investigated different facets of the board of directors, 
including factors that determine the formation and composition of boards and their sub-committees, and how 
boards affect firm’s operating and market performance (Baker and Gompers, 2003; Boone et al. 2007; Linck et 
al., 2008; Raheja, 2005). Boone et al. (2007), for example find that board size and independence increase as 
firms grow and diversify over time. They also show that board size – but not board independence, reflects a 
trade-off between the firm–specific benefits and costs of monitoring. Some other studies investigating the board 
composition include Coles et al. (2008), Duchin et al. (2010), Ferreira et al. (2009), Guest (2008), Lehn et al. 
(2009), Monem (2013) and Prevost et al. (2002). 
3. Anthony and Ramesh (1992) provide one of the first empirical procedures for classifying firms into different 
life cycle stages. However, we do not use their method for three reasons. These include (i) The life cycle 
classification based on (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992) requires a five year history of variables, removing true 
“introduction stage” firms from the sample. Thus, no data (and, as such, no meaningful analyses) on 
introduction stage firms are available. (ii) Dickinson (2011) has shown that life cycle classification based on the 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) procedure leads to an erronous classification of the stage of firms in the life cycle. 
(iii) This classification procedure is ‘ad hoc’ and relies on portfolio sorts to classify the firm into different life 
cycle stages. 
4. Lenders are likely to demand more advisory directors on the board to avoid future investment expenditures 
due to covenant violations (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Armstrong et al. (2010) posit that debt providers often 
emphasize on the advising role of the boards as firms seek expert advice on investment decisions. 
5.  Large firms have diversified and complex operations which requires bigger boards and hence including both 
variables in the same model may not be warranted. However, since our outcome variable is related to board 
composition, inclusion of board size along with firm size is justifiable. Boone et al. (2007) and Guest (2009) 
also include firm size and board size in the same regression model. 
6. This number is smaller than the ASX population (retrieved from Compustat Global) of 21,225 firm-year 
observations as reported in Panel B of Table 1, because we need non-missing cash flow data to calculate the life 
cycle measure. Some of the observations on the ASX sample retrieved from COMPUSTAT does not have the 
required cash flow data.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and industry breakdown. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics    
 
 Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Life cycle 
measures 
INTRO 11,251 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GROWTH 11,251 0.195 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MATURE 11,251 0.263 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SHAKE-OUT 11,251 0.131 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DECLINE 11,251 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Director 
characteristics 
ADVDIR 11,251 0.486 0.318 0.250 0.400 0.667 
ADVDIR_IND 11,251 0.259 0.270 0.000 0.200 0.400 
ADVDIR_EXEC 11,251 0.294 0.177 0.167 0.250 0.400 
MONDIR 11,251 0.290 0.269 0.000 0.250 0.500 
MONDIR/ADVDIR 10,289 0.915 1.164 0.000 0.500 1.333 
BOTHDIR  11,251 0.173 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.375 
BSIZE 11,251 6.018 2.213 4.000 6.000 7.000 
INDPEN 11,251 0.706 0.177 0.600 0.750 0.833 
Control 
variables  
SIZE 11,251 16.577 4.628 15.810 17.520 19.180 
LEV 11,251 0.108 0.189 0.000 0.012 0.178 
MTB 11,251 2.678 3.854 0.870 1.630 3.100 
PPE 11,251 0.352 0.351 0.051 0.238 0.574 
 
 
 Panel B: Industry distribution  
    ASX  ASX  
Industry 
code 
GICS Industry sector Observations Percentages Observations percentages 
      
10 Energy 
 
  1,428   12.69%  2,876   13.55% 
15 Materials 
 
  3,712   32.99%  7,838   36.93% 
20  Industrials 
 
  1,783   15.85%  2,693   12.69% 
25 Consumer Discretionary 
 
  1,560   13.87%  2,249   10.60% 
30 Consumer Staples 
 
     491     4.36%     810     3.82% 
35 Health Care 
 
  1,004     8.92%  1,889     8.90% 
45 Information Technology 
 
     860     7.64%  2,112     9.95% 
50 Telecommunication Services 
 
     252     2.24%     374     1.76% 
55 Utilities 
 
     161     1.43%     384     1.81% 
 Total 11,251 100.00% 21,225 100.00% 
 
 
Notes: INTRO is an indicator variable coded 1 if a particular firm-year observation is in the ‘introduction’ stage 
of the firm life cycle. GROWTH, MATURE, SHAKE-OUT, and DECLINE are defined accordingly. ADVDIR 
is the ratio of number of advisory directors to total board size. ADVDIR_IND is the ratio of number of 
independent advisory detectors to total board size. ADVDIR_EXEC is the ratio of number of executive advisory 
directors excluding the CEO to total board size. MONDIR is the ratio of number of independent directors who 
are members of either AC or RC or both, to total board size. MONDIR/ADVDIR is the ratio of the total 
numbers of monitoring directors to advisory directors. The number of firm-year observations for this variable 
drops down to 10,289, as 962 observations had no advisory directors. BOTHDIR is the ratio of the number of 
directors with both advisory and monitoring expertise to the total board size. BSIZE is the number of directors 
on the board. INDPEN is the ratio of number of independent directors on the board to total board size. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets. MTB is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, 
and equipment to total assets.   
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Table 2:  Life cycle-wise mean difference of advisory, monitoring and both advisory and monitoring 
directors: HSD-test. 
   
Estimates 
Group means 
     (Stage 1)                      (Stage 2) 
Mean 
differences 
HSD-testa 
 INTRO GROWTH   
ADVDIR 0.597 0.392 0.204 28.94* 
MONDIR 0.240 0.335 0.095 15.21* 
BOTHDIR 0.112 0.221 0.108 17.52* 
 GROWTH MATURE   
ADVDIR 0.392 0.364 0.029 4.044* 
MONDIR 0.335 0.334 0.001 0.08 
BOTHDIR 0.221 0.251 0.031 4.94* 
 MATURE SHAKE–OUT   
ADVDIR 0.364 0.510 0.146 20.69* 
MONDIR 0.334 0.292 0.043 6.86* 
BOTHDIR 0.251 0.140 0.111 17.93* 
 SHAKE–OUT DECLINE   
ADVDIR 0.510 0.611 0.102 14.38* 
MONDIR 0.292 0.238 0.053 8.64* 
BOTHDIR 0.140 0.107 0.034 5.46* 
 INTRO MATURE   
ADVDIR 0.597 0.364 0.233 32.98* 
MONDIR 0.240 0.334 0.094 15.12* 
BOTHDIR 0.112 0.251 0.139 22.46* 
 INTRO SHAKE–OUT   
ADVDIR 0.597 0.510 0.087 12.30* 
MONDIR 0.240 0.292 0.052 8.26* 
BOTHDIR 0.112 0.140 0.028 4.53* 
 INTRO DECLINE   
ADVDIR 0.597 0.611 0.015 2.081 
MONDIR 0.240 0.238 0.002 0.38 
BOTHDIR 0.112 0.107 0.006 0.93 
 GROWTH SHAKE–OUT   
ADVDIR 0.392 0.510 0.118 16.64* 
MONDIR 0.335 0.292 0.043 6.95* 
BOTHDIR 0.221 0.140 0.080 12.99* 
 GROWTH DECLINE   
ADVDIR 0.392 0.611 0.219 31.02* 
MONDIR 0.335 0.238 0.097 15.59* 
BOTHDIR 0.221 0.107 0.114 18.45* 
 MATURE DECLINE   
ADVDIR 0.364 0.611 0.248 35.06* 
MONDIR 0.334 0.238 0.097 15.50* 
BOTHDIR 0.251 0.107 0.145 23.39* 
 
 
Notes: a For the Tukey HSD (honest significant difference) pairwise comparisons studentized range critical 
value at 5% significance level is 3.858.  
The sample consists of 11,251 non-financial firm-year observations for the period 2001-2014. All the 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. Life 
cycle is measured following the procedures proposed by Dickinson (2011). INTRO is an indicator variable 
coded 1 if a particular firm-year observation is in the ‘introduction’ stage of the firm life cycle. GROWTH, 
MATURE, SHAKE-OUT, and DECLINE are defined accordingly. ADVDIR is the ratio of number of 
advisory directors to total board size. MONDIR is the ratio of number of independent directors who are 
members of either AC or RC or both, to total board size. BOTHDIR is the ratio of the number of directors 
with both advisory and monitoring expertise to the total board size. 
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Table 3. Correlation analysis.  
 
 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[1] INTRO -                
[2] GROWTH -0.33 -               
[3] MATURE -0.41 -0.32 -              
[4] SHAKE-OUT -0.25 -0.20 -0.24 -             
[5] DECLINE -0.20 -0.16 -0.19 -0.12 -            
[6] ADVDIR 0.24 -0.13 -0.22 0.03 0.12 -           
[7] ADVDIR_IND 0.19 -0.12 -0.19 0.05 0.12 0.83 -          
[8] ADVDIR_EXEC 0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.21 -0.23 -         
[9] MONDIR -0.13 0.08 0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.56 -0.49 -0.21 -        
[10] BOTHDIR -0.15 0.08 0.16 -0.05 -0.08 -0.44 -0.38 -0.18 -0.41 -       
[11] SIZE -0.32 0.19 0.24 -0.02 -0.11 -0.22 -0.19 -0.07 0.15 0.09 -      
[12] LEV -0.12 0.16 0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.09 0.09 -     
[13] MTB 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -    
[14] PPE -0.20 0.14 0.21 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.13 0.12 0.06 0.27 0.25 -0.09 -   
[15] BSIZE 
 
-0.18 0.10 0.19 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.04 -0.27 0.06 0.14 0.31 0.18 -0.03 0.20 -  
[16] INDPEN -0.13 0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.23 -1.00 0.21 0.18 0.07 0.12 -0.04 0.13 0.27 - 
                 
 
Notes: This Table presents Pearson’s correlation analysis based on the full sample size of 11,251 firm-year observations. Bold and italicized coefficients are 
significant at p<0.001 (two-tailed tests).  INTRO is an indicator variable coded 1 if a particular firm-year observation is in the ‘introduction’ stage of the firm life 
cycle. GROWTH, MATURE, SHAKE-OUT, and DECLINE are defined accordingly. ADVDIR is the ratio of number of advisory directors to total board size. 
ADVDIR_IND is the ratio of number of independent advisory detectors to total board size. ADVDIR_EXEC is the ratio of number of executive advisory directors 
excluding the CEO to total board size. MONDIR is the ratio of number of independent directors who are members of either AC or RC or both, to total board size. 
BOTHDIR is the ratio of the number of directors with both advisory and monitoring expertise to the total board size. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets of 
the firm at the end of the fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. PPE is the 
ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. INDPEN is the ratio of number of independent directors on the 
board to total board size. 
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Table 4. Advisory directors and firm life cycle   
......(1).........εYEAR_FEEINDUSTRY_F
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  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Variables Predicted sign ADVDIR ADVDIR_IND ADVDIR_EXEC 
     
INTRO + 0.047*** 0.037*** 0.014*** 
  [3.51] [3.47] [2.79] 
GROWTH + 0.005 0.004 0.007 
  [0.57] [0.59] [1.54] 
SHAKE-OUT + 0.027** 0.024** -0.019*** 
  [2.19] [2.52] [-3.23] 
DECLINE + 0.054*** 0.039*** -0.011 
  [3.33] [2.91] [-1.46] 
SIZE ? -0.058*** -0.057*** 0.000 
  [-17.28] [-20.28] [0.06] 
LEV + 0.016 0.024 -0.005*** 
  [0.66] [1.25] [-4.58] 
MTB + -0.002 -0.001 -0.035*** 
  [-1.46] [-1.08] [-4.17] 
PPE - -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.031*** 
  [-2.71] [-2.82] [-6.10] 
BSIZE + 0.027*** 0.022*** -0.016*** 
  [11.09] [10.63] [-17.73] 
INDPEN - -0.238*** 0.493*** - 
  [-6.91] [19.09]  
Constant ? 1.638*** 0.905*** 0.501*** 
  [25.23] [17.47] [25.48] 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11,251 11,251 11,251 
 Adj. R2  0.26 0.32 0.10 
 
Notes: This table reports results from OLS regressions relating firm life cycle stages to the presence of advisory 
directors on the board for Australian listed industrial firms from 2001 to 2014. All specifications include year and 
industry fixed effects. Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorised at their 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  ADVDIR is the ratio of 
number of advisory directors to total board size. ADVDIR_IND is the ratio of number of independent advisory 
detectors to total board size. ADVDIR_EXEC is the ratio of number of executive advisory directors excluding the 
CEO to total board size. INTRO is an indicator variable coded 1 if a particular firm-year observation is in the 
‘introduction’ stage of the firm life cycle. GROWTH, SHAKE-OUT, and DECLINE are defined accordingly. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets. MTB is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets. BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. INDPEN is the ratio of number of 
independent directors on the board to total board size.
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 Table 5. Monitoring directors and firm life cycle.  
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  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Predicted sign MONDIR MONDIR/ADVDIR  BOTHDIR  
     
INTRO - -0.038*** -0.257*** -0.028** 
  [-3.27] [-5.38] [-2.25] 
GROWTH - 0.009 0.015 -0.014 
  [1.08] [0.35] [-1.50] 
SHAKE-OUT - -0.020* -0.193*** -0.028** 
  [-1.76] [-3.96] [-2.41] 
DECLINE - -0.056*** -0.290*** -0.026* 
  [-3.85] [-5.11] [-1.76] 
SIZE + -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
  [-0.45] [-0.63] [1.04] 
LEV + 0.052*** 0.252*** 0.037*** 
  [3.82] [4.61] [13.30] 
MTB - -0.010 0.028 0.005 
  [-0.45] [0.34] [0.23] 
PPE + 0.050*** 0.181*** -0.011 
  [3.46] [3.20] [-0.84] 
BSIZE + -0.007*** -0.027*** -0.010*** 
  [-2.97] [-3.22] [-4.17] 
INDPEN + 0.314*** 1.378*** 0.158*** 
  [12.12] [14.53] [6.96] 
Constant  -0.035 -0.636*** -0.667*** 
  [-0.80] [-3.58] [-13.17] 
Industry FE  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES 
Obs.   11,251 10,289 11,251 
Adj. R2  0.0.09 0.09 0.19 
 
Notes: This table reports results from OLS regressions relating firm life cycle stages to the presence of monitoring 
directors on the board of Australian listed industrial firms from 2001 to 2014. All specifications include year and 
industry fixed effects. Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorised at their 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Variable definitions are in 
Table 1. MONDIR is the ratio of number of independent directors who are members of either AC or RC or both, to 
total board size. MONDIR/ADVDIR is the ratio of the total numbers of monitoring directors to advisory directors. 
The number of firm-year observations for this variable drops down to 10,289, as 962 observations had no advisory 
directors. BOTHDIR is the ratio of the number of directors with both advisory and monitoring expertise to the total 
board size. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets. MTB is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. PPE is the ratio of 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets.  BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. INDPEN is the ratio 
of number of independent directors on the board to total board size. 
 
